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The growth in private ﬁnancial ﬂows to developing coun-
tries, as well as the expansion in their revenues from natural
resource extraction, is reducing their dependence on oﬃcial
development assistance (ODA). Developing countries can
now beneﬁt from considerably more foreign direct investment,
portfolio capital ﬂows, and remittance ﬂows than they did in
the past. The rise in commodity prices over the last decade
has contributed to the growth in export earnings as well as for-
eign exchange reserves, making low-income countries (LICs)
much less dependent on ODA to ﬁnance imports. Revenues
from resource extraction are in many cases now providing
considerable amounts of public revenue, and improvements
in tax administration have bolstered the public ﬁnances more
generally. Many LICs are now less dependent on ODA to
ﬁnance their development budgets.
Some of this success can be attributed to aid itself, although
by how much remains a point of vigorous debate. Our judge-
ment is that aid-ﬁnanced infrastructure has helped improve
the incentive for domestic and foreign investment, thereby
improving the supply-side of economies—export sectors in
particular. Aid-ﬁnanced human capital investments—via
healthcare, education, safe water, and sanitation—have not
only improved human development but also added to the
long-run growth potential of LICs. The support of aid to insti-
tution-building has generally improved the quality of budget-
ary management as well the ability of tax institutions to
mobilize more domestic revenue. Hence, the reduction in the
overall dependence of developing countries on ODA is in part
a function of aid itself.1Nevertheless, we should avoid complacency. Progress is diﬃ-
cult to make in the “fragile states,” a sub-group of LICs whose
governance problems and susceptibility to violent conﬂict
makes it diﬃcult for aid to gain traction (Addison, 2012). Strong
criticisms of aid continue to be made, especially in the popular
press and in the legislatures of donor countries. Moreover,
donors must undoubtedly rethink their aid policy as LICs con-
tinue to graduate to middle-income status, implying both a
change in the nature of their economic opportunities and policy
problems. For this reason, we will no doubt see a reconﬁgura-
tion of aid modalities over the coming decade, and the debate
over the “post-2015 development agenda” is already part of this.
That reconﬁguration of aid, and the design and implementa-
tion of eﬀective aid, requires a deeper understanding of aid’s
impact and the overall funding and policy environment in
which it operates. There are many dimensions to this
understanding, and no single individual, nor any one
organization, can claim to have all the answers. Aid is far
too multi-dimensional and complex for that. For its part,
UNU-WIDER has sought to make a meaningful contribution
through an initiative on Research and Communication on
Foreign Aid (ReCom), which has in recent years undertaken
a comprehensive assessment of what works and what mightSweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida).
2 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwork in aid. 1 ReCom has identiﬁed and sought to analyze and
gather evidence on aid’s many dimensions.
To take just three important dimensions, we developed more
rigorous analysis of how aid impacts on economic growth,
more insight into how the supply-side of aid is aﬀected by
changing macroeconomic conditions in donor and recipient
economies (and the coordination problem between suppliers),
and a better perspective on the macroeconomic management
of aid ﬂows (particularly their ﬁscal dimensions). This
UNU-WIDER special issue explores these three topics,
through 10 studies, eight of which originate under ReCom. 2
This introduction provides an overview of the studies, and
draws out some of their key messages, especially for policy.2. OVERVIEW OF THE SPECIAL ISSUE
The eﬀectiveness of aid in assisting economic growth has long
been an issue of prime importance to the policy debate, and a
variety of views have emerged, both positive and negative, from
successive waves of research (Temple, 2010). The ﬁrst two
papers in this special issue focus on the aid–growth relationship.
Given the numerous determinants of growth itself, and the
potential for endogeneity, it is unsurprising that econometric
methodology has been of key concern. The choices made
regarding econometric models, the use of data (and whether
data points are excluded), as well as the estimation methods
used and the assumptions made with regard to endogeneity,
are all important in driving the varying results to be found in
the literature regarding aid’s relationship to growth (Clemens,
Radelet, Bhavnani, & Bazzi, 2012; Dalgaard, Hansen, & Tarp,
2004; Juselius, Framroze-Møller, & Tarp, 2014).
In “Assessing Foreign Aid’s Long-run Contribution to
Growth and Development,” by Channing Arndt, Sam Jones,
and Finn Tarp, the authors extend the earlier analysis of
Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010) by adding seven additional
years of data and by investigating the eﬀect of aid on addi-
tional ﬁnal outcomes (poverty, inequality, structural change)
and intermediate outcomes (investment, consumption, tax)
and social outcomes (education, health) (Arndt et al., this
issue). Following Arndt et al. (2010) aid is instrumented for
from a model of its supply-side determinants at the donor–
recipient level. The results of the study by Arndt et al. in this
special issue show that aid, in addition to simulating growth,
has also promoted structural transformation, improved social
indicators, and reduced poverty in the long run (but has no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on inequality). There is evidence that the posi-
tive eﬀect of aid on growth is transmitted via investments in
physical and human capital (through funding improved provi-
sion of infrastructure as well as healthcare and education).
This is a broader assessment of the eﬀectiveness of aid than
that presented in the cross-country econometric aid literature
so far. Although expectations for aid in the early years of devel-
opment were too high, the cumulative impact of aid over time
has not been insubstantial, and aid has certainly not been detri-
mental in the way asserted by critics such asMoyo (2009). With
structural transformation now moving to the center of debates
around the “post-2015 development agenda,” aid could play a
stronger role in the achievement of inclusive growth in addition
to its focus over the last decade on human development.
One recent time-series contribution to the aid–growth
literature, Nowak-Lehmann, Dreher, Herzer, Klasen, and
Martı´nez-Zarzoso (2012) (henceforth “NDHKM”) ﬁnds that
aid has an insigniﬁcant or minute signiﬁcant negative impact
on per capita income in recipient countries. In “Aid and
Income: Another Time-Series Perspective,” Matthijs Lof,Tseday Jemaneh Mekasha, and Finn Tarp empirically re-
examine the work of NDHKM, speciﬁcally focusing on their
choices for data transformation and estimation strategy. Lof
et al. (this issue) apply VAR models instead of the single-equa-
tion model used by NDHKM. Lof et al. ﬁnd that NDHKM in
taking a log-transformation of variables with negative values,
non-randomly dropped observations, and thereby wrongly
claim to uncover a lack of eﬀect of aid on growth. The authors
apply a Panel VAR model to the dataset of NDHKM. This
empirical strategy explicitly allows for endogeneity and ﬁnds
a positive long-term eﬀect of aid on income, in contrast to
NDHKM, and using the same dataset. Econometric method-
ology therefore remains critical to the aid–growth debate, and
the evidence now emerging suggests a signiﬁcant (although at
times modest) contribution of aid to growth.
The next ﬁve studies in this special issue focus on the supply-
side of aid; its response to ﬂuctuations in economic conditions
in both donors and recipients (Dabla-Norris et al.; Jones); its
volatility and the impact of this on recipients (Hudson), and
the presence of coordination (or not) between donors (Bigsten
and Tengstam; Bourguignon and Platteau).
The post-2009 ﬁnancial crisis in the group of high-income
countries has put pressure on aid budgets in many if not most
aid donors (Addison, Arndt, & Tarp, 2011; OECD, 2011). It
remains to be seen whether the recent ﬁnancial crisis has last-
ing eﬀects on the bilateral programs of aid donors as well as
their contributions to multilateral aid organizations, and
whether the more pessimistic forecasts do come to pass. The
evidence to date is inconclusive as to the relationship between
aid and the business cycle in donor economies (Mold, Olcer, &
Prizzon, 2008). Whatever the eventual outcome, the crisis has
renewed interest in what determines the supply of aid, both in
the short run as well as the long run, and two studies in this
special issue add to our knowledge.
In “Aid Supplies Over Time: Addressing Heterogeneity,
Trends and Dynamics,” Sam Jones (this issue) focuses on how
economic conditions in donor countries as well as other factors
inﬂuence the supply of aid. Jones notes that bilateral aid broadly
follows long-run trends determined by ﬁxed and slow-moving
factors such as historical linkages (past colonial history, in par-
ticular). Jones also ﬁnds considerable heterogeneity across
donor countries and over time. For example, Norway has
tended to consistently increase its aid budget, and Norway’s
aid is relatively stable, whereas Italy and others have switched
between periods of cutting and increasing their aid budgets.
This reﬂects the impact of ﬁscal restraint, which Jones ﬁnds to
be a short-run determinant of aid supply. There is also a “band-
wagon eﬀect,” whereby donors increase or reduce their aid at
the same time. This is especially evident among large aid donors.
Jones cautions us to avoid extrapolating from past trends and
behavior in attempting to forecast future aid ﬂows.
Of course developing countries also face macroeconomic
shocks which are generally much more severe than those of
developed countries. It is therefore of policy interest to establish
whether aid ﬂows also respond to those shocks, in addition to
the impact on aid ﬂows of the business cycle in the donor coun-
tries themselves. Both these challenges are taken up in “Business
Cycle Fluctuations, Large Macroeconomic Shocks and Devel-
opment Aid,” by Era Dabla-Norris, Camelia Minoiu, and
Luis-Felipe Zanna who empirically analyze the link between
bilateral aid ﬂows and negative macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
that hit the donors, the recipients, or both simultaneously.
The analysis of Dabla-Norris et al. complements the study
by Jones, both in this special issue, and also further deepens
our insights into the determinants of bilateral aid supply. With
regard to the business cycle in donor countries, total bilateral
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recession; i.e., it is procyclical. Booms in donor economies lead
to increases in aid of between 20% and 100%. Recessions
reduce aid by around 11% on average. However, at the indi-
vidual donor level there is considerable variation—bilateral
aid from the United States and the United Kingdom is the
most procyclical, while aid from Australia, Austria, and Bel-
gium is the most countercyclical. Worryingly, aid ﬂows to
low-income countries are more procyclical than to middle-
income countries, despite the greater diﬃculty of the former
in accessing other sources of development ﬁnance. Turning
to the recipient business cycle, there is some good news—bilat-
eral donors increase aid considerably when recipients experi-
ence severe shocks (adverse terms of trade movements,
natural disasters, etc.). Bilateral aid does at least cushion some
of the impact of the shocks.
In summary, it is not just the level of aid and its trend that are
important; ﬂuctuations matter too. The 2005 Paris Declaration
includes a pledge to make aid more predictable (OECD, 2008).
What is the impact of aid volatility for its development eﬀective-
ness? This has been an increasing concern (Bulı´rˇ, Gelb, & Mos-
ley, 2007; Celasun & Walliser, 2008). As a way of ﬁnancing
development, aid is more volatile in aggregate than other
sources of government revenue (Bulı´rˇ & Hamann, 2008). The
existing literature has studied aid volatility at the aggregate level;
how changes in the level of aid aﬀect economic growth and total
government expenditure. But the sectoral eﬀects of aid volatility
are important as well, as volatility is unlikely to be the same
across sectors (spending on health versus infrastructure, for
example). Moreover, the impact of a given amount of aid vola-
tility on development outcomes (educational attainment, health
indicators, etc.) is unlikely to be equal across sectors.
Moving the analysis of aid volatility from the aggregate to the
sectoral level is the task undertaken in “Consequences of Aid
Volatility for Macroeconomic Management and Aid Eﬀective-
ness,” by JohnHudson (this issue). The study ﬁnds that aid vol-
atility does indeed vary by sector—aid for debt relief, industrial
development, and program assistance is the most volatile, while
aid for health, education, and the social sectors is relatively less
volatile. If debt relief is removed, then aid volatility is much
reduced. Hudson also looks at how donors adjust the sectoral
distribution of their aid in the face of aid volatility. The study
ﬁnds that aid volatility is not simply short-lived and followed
by a return to normal aid levels. Aid volatility tends to be cor-
rected for in the following period rather than there being a sim-
ple return to trend. There are also cross-sector spillover eﬀects;
volatility in one aid sector does sometimes lead to volatility in
another. Volatility in individual aid sectors also has an eﬀect
on the likelihood of achieving the goals of those sectors. For
example, volatility in aid for industry and infrastructure aﬀects
eﬀorts to improve access to information communications tech-
nology. Overall, Hudson’s results point to the need for more in-
depth work on aid at the sectoral level.
The aggregate supply of aid is an outcome of a myriad of
donor decisions, sometimes coordinated, often not (Knack &
Rahman, 2007; Torsvik, 2005). There have been successive
attempts to improve the situation, including the 2003 Rome
Declaration on Harmonization, the Paris Declaration on
Aid Eﬀectiveness, the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, and
the 2011 Busan Partnership for Eﬀective Development
Cooperation (OECD, 2008, 2011). The four key dimensions
of better aid coordination that have evolved out of these
processes are: harmonization, ownership, alignment, and
accountability. Two studies in this UNU-WIDER special issue
discuss and analyze aid coordination: Bigsten & Tengstam;
and Bourguignon & Platteau.The Paris Declaration agenda has a broad scope. It covers
both how donors relate to one another and their relationship
with recipients. In “International Coordination and the Eﬀec-
tiveness of Aid,” Arne Bigsten and Sven Tengstam focus on
relations between donors (Bigsten & Tengstam, this issue).
But they also argue that improvements in donor relations will
have positive eﬀects on recipients. Recipients will, for example,
be more able to exercise ownership of their national develop-
ment process if they can engage with a cohesive group of
donors rather than with donors on an individual basis, with
numerous diﬀering requirements (such as reporting stan-
dards). Greater donor coordination will also make it easier
to achieve the alignment goal. Donors are more likely to base
their own policies on recipient priorities if donors act together,
and do not pursue individual national priorities. A cohesive
group of donors is less likely to promote disparate projects,
and are more likely to use the management systems that recip-
ients already have in place for project management.
More donor coordination will reduce transaction costs.
Bigsten and Tengstam assess the gains to donors from having
fewer partners and from shifting their aid from projects to pro-
grams. One additional beneﬁt of more coordination would to
be to improve the allocation of aid resources across countries.
Bigsten and Tengstam calculate some of the savings that better
donor coordination could generate. An annual saving of
US$915 million could be achieved by reducing aid disbursed
via projects and increasing program assistance to 66% of total
aid (the Paris target) from its level of 39% in 2009. By reducing
the number of partner countries and shifting to program
rather than project aid, total donor savings of more than
US$2 billion per year could be achieved. These are signiﬁcant
amounts, and the savings could then be allocated to poverty
reduction and other development goals.
If greater aid coordination yields signiﬁcant beneﬁts, both
for the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of aid, then why does it
seem so diﬃcult to achieve more? One answer to this question
is that while aid coordination reduces transaction costs and
improves aid governance it also implies a loss of political con-
trol by the donor. That “cost” to the donor may be the decid-
ing factor in the donor’s behavior, leading to a low level of
cooperation with other donors. In “The Hard Challenge of
Aid Coordination,” Francois Bourguignon and Jean-Philippe
Platteau (this issue) explore this trade-oﬀ in the second paper
on aid coordination in this special issue.
Bourguignon and Platteau set out a multi-player coordina-
tion game in which the decisions of the donor countries are
modeled under two separate assumptions. In the ﬁrst, it is
assumed that donors have identical preferences. When donors
are identical Bourguignon and Platteau ﬁnd that more aid
coordination will occur if donors attach more importance to
poverty reduction than national sovereignty (and coordina-
tion eﬀorts increase when aid budgets are smaller). Donors
still attempt to free ride, reducing their cooperation as the
donor pool expands. A second set of assumptions posits het-
erogeneity in donor preferences and budgets. Some (big)
donors have larger budgets and a greater preference for polit-
ical independence, which they attach a higher cost to losing
than smaller donors. While the larger donors prefer less coor-
dination than the smaller donors, the eﬀective level of coordi-
nation depends on the decision mechanism. A central
authority may decide the level of coordination, bearing in
mind the interests of both types of donors, or the bigger
donors may use their power to impose their preferred level
of coordination, resulting in lower coordination, higher trans-
actions costs, and therefore less aid available to meet its ulti-
mate goals.
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where a variety of reforms to aid policy have been imple-
mented since 1996 when the country was selected as a pilot
country by the Development Assistance Committee of the
OECD to review aid eﬀectiveness. Field interviews conducted
by the authors ﬁnd that there has been some improvement in
coordination among donors and between the donors and the
government of Mali, especially in the education and health
sectors. Yet coordination is still far from satisfactory. Among
others, donors remain reluctant to cede control over projects
or pool resources. This is especially the case in rural develop-
ment where the percentage of projects that are joint donor
projects (15%) is far below the target of 66%. Donors retain
diﬀerent philosophies over the use of aid, and are reluctant
to cede control over their projects or to pool ﬁnancial
resources. As a result parallel structures for aid management
continue to exist, despite the evident savings and other beneﬁts
that would result from better coordination. This lends cre-
dence to the trade-oﬀ highlighted in the theoretical part of
the Bourguignon and Platteau study.
Aid inﬂows have strong macroeconomic eﬀects, and need to
be placed within an appropriate and supporting macroeco-
nomic framework, especially with regard to ﬁscal policy and
exchange rate policy. The last three studies in this UNU-
WIDER special issue contribute to the macroeconomics of
aid: Berg et al.; Morrissey; Mosley.
Aid can be expected to impact on ﬁscal behavior—in particu-
lar the level, evolution and composition of government spend-
ing, the level and composition of taxation, and the level and
proﬁle of government borrowing. Considerable energy has been
directed toward ﬁscal reform by governments with the support
of both bilateral and multilateral donors. This engagement
and its eﬀects are discussed in this special issue byOliverMorris-
sey in “Aid andGovernment Fiscal Behavior: Assessing Recent
Evidence,” and by PaulMosley in “Fiscal Composition andAid
Eﬀectiveness: APolitical EconomyModel.”Since both focus on
the same area,we discuss them together.Morrissey undertakes a
comprehensive survey of the recent literature, whileMosley sets
out and estimates a political economy model.
It is sometimes argued that aid can reduce tax eﬀort, since
politicians might have an incentive to fund public spending
using aid rather than go through the politically painful process
of raising revenue. However, aid itself can be used to build bet-
ter tax systems and enable recipients to diversify their narrow
range of taxes. If so, then aid might raise rather than reduce
tax revenue. Both arguments are plausible. If a governing elite
takes a short-term view of its interests, then it might well opt
for using aid as a substitute for taxation. But if it takes a long-
term view that development and state-building is in its own
interests then it may seek to mobilize more tax revenue along-
side aid to fund public spending on development. The out-
come is therefore likely to be highly country-speciﬁc. This is
conﬁrmed by Morrissey who ﬁnds from his survey of the
literature that there is no evidence of a systematic eﬀect of
aid on tax eﬀort; conclusions must be country-speciﬁc.
Paul Mosley analyses the political economy to clarify the
causal relationship between aid, taxation, and the public
spending which they both fund. Mosley sets out four hypoth-
eses: (i) elites may move to an inclusive ﬁscal strategy when
they realize that an exclusive strategy has failed to deliver
development; (ii) they may use an inclusive ﬁscal strategy to
signal that a more durable political settlement is possible;
(iii) recipients and donors may build a relationship in which
the elite draws upon that assistance to deepen and widen the
tax base; and (iv) macroeconomic pressures, including an
unsustainable ﬁscal position, can push countries into taxreform, supported by donors. The study then tests this politi-
cal economy model empirically. Mosley ﬁnds evidence that
aid, through providing technical assistance to improve and
widen the tax base, and by raising growth (which in turn raises
tax revenue), can have a positive rather than a negative impact
on a government’s ﬁscal performance. Mosley concludes that
the increased willingness of governments to ﬁnance their
spending out of tax revenue, and not just from aid, has been
a key element in making public expenditure, and therefore
aid, more eﬀective over time. Aid becomes more eﬀective as
it incentivizes rather than substitutes for the creation of tax
revenue—this is an important message for aid policy.
Much energy has been devoted over the years to the issue of
whether aid is fungible or not. Morrissey argues that two recent
results stand out: (i) the way in which oﬀ-budget aid is treated
signiﬁcantly over-estimates the extent to which aid is fungible,
and (ii) importantly, even where aid is fungible, it does not sig-
niﬁcantly reduce aid eﬀectiveness. Morrissey also ﬁnds that aid
increases total spending but this is not a 1-to-1 increase as other
revenue sources are aﬀected. There is no systematic eﬀect from
aid to tax revenue, but increases in aid are often associated with
reductions in borrowing, a result of IMF conditionality. Aid
also aﬀects the composition of spending—experience with gen-
eral budgetary support suggests that it helps increase social sec-
tor spending and has the desired eﬀect on the ﬁscal response. In
sum, Morrissey’s careful review of the studies to date, and the
evidence in them, shows the importance of building a better
country-speciﬁc understanding of aid’s ﬁscal impact.
In “PolicyResponses toAid Surges inCountries with Limited
Capital Mobility: The Role of the Exchange Rate Regime,”
Andrew Berg, Rafael Portillo, and Luis-Felipe Zanna (this
issue) examine the range of possible central bank responses to
aid surges. They analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of steriliza-
tion and reserve accumulation policies under diﬀerent exchange
rate regimes (ﬁxed versus managed ﬂoat) with limited capital
mobility. Their paper builds a two-sector model of a small open
economy, calibrates it to represent the economy of Uganda for
the period 2008–09 and then runs various plausible simulations.
These show that following an aid surge, the policies of steriliza-
tion under a peg and that of reserve accumulation under a ﬂoat
limit inﬂation but can lead to the crowding out of the private
sector. This in turn may limit aid absorption and lead to lower
welfare. In sum, aid inﬂows need careful macroeconomic man-
agement to ensure that theywork to achieve their desired results
for growth.
The exploration of policy options in this paper is important
given the prominence of the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon
that has repeatedly been raised in the debate on aid eﬀective-
ness (Adam & Bevan, 2006; Rajan & Subramanian, 2008;
Younger, 1992). While aid can improve the supply-side of a
recipient economy (through better infrastructure, for exam-
ple), it also has a potentially negative eﬀect on growth via its
demand-side eﬀect. Aid increases demand, and with an inelas-
tic supply of non-tradables, the relative price of non-tradables
can rise relative to that of tradables (including exportables)
thereby harming overall growth when tradables are the growth
driver. This relative price change is a real exchange rate
appreciation, and the nominal exchange rate may appreciate
as well if a ﬂexible rather than ﬁxed exchange rate policy is
pursued (Buﬃe, Adam, O’Connell, & Pattillo 2004). Whether
aid (or other inﬂows) has signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects on the real
economy depends in part on the macroeconomic framework
that is in place, particularly monetary policy which can be
used to dampen some of the aggregate demand eﬀect that
drives the real exchange rate appreciation (Adam, O’Connell,
Buﬃe, & Pattillo, 2009). Dutch Disease arising from aid
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sume. Since Dutch Disease can arise from any large inﬂow,
including a natural resource boom as well as increased remit-
tances, research on the macroeconomic response to aid inﬂows
is also of wider relevance to other types of inﬂow.3. CONCLUSIONS
There has been a lively debate on the growth eﬀects of for-
eign aid in recent years. With more data, and better economet-
ric technique, some clarity has emerged, and two of the studies
in this special issue of World Development strengthen the case
for aid’s positive growth impact, and its positive role for
human development. This does not imply that aid helps
growth in every situation, nor that aid is the most important
determinant of growth or human development. Neither does
it necessarily imply that aid can be scaled up in all recipients.
Some are highly fragile, with a weak capacity to absorb aid
until institutions are successfully built (thereby requiring aid
to support such institution-building).
The studies in this special issue which discuss the supply-side
of aid show how economic conditions in both donor and recipi-
ent countries aﬀect the amount of aid available. One continuing
worry, which is conﬁrmed by several studies herein, is the pro-ScienceD
Available online at www.cyclical nature of some bilateral aid. Aid remains too volatile,
and recipients would be well advised to continue diversifying
their sources of ﬁnance to reduce their dependence on aid,
and therefore the vulnerability of their development budgets
to volatile aid. Of course, donors must do more to coordinate,
and there are large gains to be had from doing so, but, as this
special issue shows, aid coordination is a hard road, despite
all the well-meaning pronouncements over the last decade.
The macroeconomics of aid continues to be a rich area for
policy-relevant research. The ﬁscal dimension is crucial, as this
special issue demonstrates, especially with regard to the mobili-
zation of more tax revenue that can, together with aid, ﬁnance
more public-spending to break critical development traps. This
is a topic that merits further investigation in the context of the
post-2015 development debate. Equally important is themacro-
economic management of aid inﬂows, in particular with regard
to exchange rate policy, monetary policy, and reserve accumu-
lation. Furtherwork in this area for aid could yield useful results
for other types of capital inﬂow as well.
The aid debate becomes over heated at times as rhetoric
rather than analysis comes to the fore. We hope that this spe-
cial issue ofWorld Development will stimulate further rigorous
research on aid, its modalities, and its impact, so that the
advantages and disadvantages of aid can be calmly evaluated.NOTES1. For further information on ReCom—Research and Communication
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